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Recommendation: DENY 
The response contends tha~ he ~ ecision below rests upor 1 _ .. --- ~"" ~. ~
an independent state round, because etr 1~ ted an 
~
,,,,. '\,\ - ~ 
"admonition" rather than an "instruc 1 "that no emphasis was to 
be given to the defendant's failure~~, ~,_14 ~ 
. c~~4 
Resp's argument is persuasive. u rl'aer Ke ~t ~ cky l aw, an 
J l '-' ---------- r/..~d. : ~ ~"' d4..i¼ t-LZ, 
admonition is a judge's comment upon ~ nee as tha t evi-
d ' d h ' 
1 1 1, ' ~ J'?~h ence 1s presente tote Jury; an 1nstruct1on - i ~ given at t e J 
close of the taking of evidence, before final argument to the 
jury. Of the number of procedural distinctions between these 
devices, the most important for this case is the rule that "an 
l admonition as to the weight or effect of evidence ••• is never proper." Weichhand v. Garlinger, 447 S.W.2d 606, 610 (1969). 
Under Kentucky law, an instruction, not an admonition, is the 
appropriate form for a Carter instruction that the jury is to 
give no "evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify." 
450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). 
By insisting that petr request an instruction rather 
than an admonition, the Kentucky courts are not seeking to evade 
enforcement of a federal right. The distinction between an admo-
nition and an instruction is apparently one with which a reason-
ably versed practitioner in the Kentucky courts would be famil-
iar. Further, Kentucky has implemented Carter by enacting Ken-
- - page 2. 
tucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.54(3}, which requires the 
judge to give a Carter instruction if the defendant so requests. 
When a state has provided a fair and practicable procedure for 
enforcing a federal right in the course of a criminal trial, it 
is incumbent upon a defendant to follow that procedure. 
Because petr failed to request the trial court below to 
give the appropriate instruction, he was_j:>arred on appeal from 
challenging the failure to give the instruction and so cannot 
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Cert to Kentucky Supreme 
Court (Stephenson) 
State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: The TC denied petr's request that it tell the 
jury not to draw an adverse inference from petr's failure to 
testify. 
✓ 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Petr was the .. basketball 
coach at Kentucky State University. He was charged with ~ 
second-degree burglary, receiving stolen property, and first-
CFt' 
~(( 
~( 'C ~ . ~ a ~ ~ f. t-..C4JC.. 




-/s-~~2:g..,~ ~ .' 
degree rape. The evidence at trial showed that he entered a 
t 1' 
neighbor's apartment under false pretences, ana then took her 
back to his apartment where he raped her after threatening her 
with a gun. 
At trial, petr did not take the stand. Counsel timely ,, ,, 
requested the TC "that an admonition be given to the jury that 
no emphasis be given to the defendant's failure to 
testify .••• " Petn. 8. The TC denied this reg.uest. The jury 
returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts. These ver-
dicts triggered persistent felony proceedings, and the jury 
convicted petr as a first degree persistent felony offender 
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 
✓ 
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court 






(1981), a defendant has the right to an "instruction" to the 
jury on the failure of the defendant to testify. However, it 
purpor tea to distinguish between an 
struction": 
"admonition" and an "in-
"There is a vast difference in a request for an admo-
nition and a requested instruction. [Petr] was enti-
tled to the instruction but did not ask for it. The 
trial court properly denied the request for an admoni-
tion." Petn. App. 3. 
Thus, it was not error for the TC to deny the request for an 
admonition. 
The Kentucky Court did not address whether, if there 
had been error, it would have been harmless. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the TC and Kentucky 
Supreme Court have clearly violated Carter v. Kentucky, 450 
• 
- - 3 - -
U.S. 288 (1981). There is no difference between an "admoni-
tion" and an "instruction" for these purposes. The important 
point is that petr was entitled to have the jury told that it 
could not draw an adverse inference from his failure to 
testify. 
Nor is there any possibility that the Kentucky Sup. Ct. 
determined that the error was harmless. 
case, Commonweal th v. McIntosh, Jr., 
In another recent 
S. W. 2d (Feb. 
16, 1983), that court hela that the failure to comply with 
Carter was harmless error. Thus, the Kentucky Court knows how 
to make a finding of harmless error when it wants to. 
DISCUSSION: Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, held 
that it violates the Fifth Amendment to tell a jury that it 
may draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to 
testify. The rationale of the case was that a def end ant 
should not be penalized by the court for the exercise of his 
constitutional right not to testify. Griffin was extended in 
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), where this Court held 
(by an 8-1 vote) that "the Fifth Amendment requires that a 
er iminal trial judge must give a 'no-adverse-inference' jury 
instruction when requested by a defendant to do so." Id., at 
300. The Court reasoned: 
"No judge can prevent jurors from speculating about 
why a defendant stands mute in the face of a criminal 
accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to 
do so, use the unique power of the jury instruction to 
reduce that speculation to a minimum." Id., at 303. 
The TJ clearly violated Carter by denying petr' s re-
quest for an "admonition" regarding his failure to testify. I 
~-
~ 
- - 4 - -
cannot see any difference between a request for an "admoni-
tion" ana a request for an "instruction" in the circumstances 
of this case. The Kentucky Supreme Court has defined an "ad-
monition" as 
"any authoritative oral communication or statement by 
way of advice or caution by the court to the jury re-
specting their duty or conduct as jurors •••• " Miller 
v. Noell, 193 Ky. 659, 237 S. W. 2d 373, 374 (19?2). 
That is, an "instruction" would tell the jury that it "must 
not" draw an adverse inference, and an "admonition" would tell 
the jury that it "should not" draw an adverse inference. I 
cannot understana how a defendant can have the constitutional 
right to require the court to tell the jury that it "must not" 
draw an adverse inference, but not have the constitutional 
right to require the court to tell the jury that it "should 
not" draw an adverse inference. In each case, the judge is 
required to act to reduce the jury's speculation about why the 
defendant has not testified. Thus, the TJ violated Carter by 
denying petr's request that the jury be admonished to give "no 
emphasis" to the defendant's failure to testify. 
It is possible that the Kentucky Supreme Court simply 
misunderstood Carter, and did not intend to flout this Court's 
decision. However, unless "admonition" means something radi-
cally different in Kentucky from what it normally means, the 
fact is that the decision below is plainly contrary to Carter. 
While a good argument can be made that both Griffin and Carter 
were wrongly decided, until this Court overrules them, they 
must be followed by state courts. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
... ... ' 
~-
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370, 375 (1982) {per curiam), this Court summarily reversed 
the CA4 for not following Supreme Court precedent, stating 
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the feder-
al juaicial system, a precedent of this Court must be 
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to 
be." 
The same principle applies to the State Supreme Courts, which 
are duty-bound to uphold the Cons ti tut ion as interpreted by 
this Court. Accordingly, the Court should summarily vacate 
the decision below, and remand for a determination whether the 
error was harmless. 
I recommend CFR. 
Response waivea. 
June 24, 1983 Levene Opn in petn 
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Cert to Kentucky Supreme 
Court (Stephenson) 
State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: The TC denied petr's request that it tell the 
jury not to draw an adverse inference from petr's failure to 
testify. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Petr was the basketball 
coach at Kentucky State University. He was charged with 
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degree rape. The evidence at trial showed that he entered a 
neighbor's apartment under false pretences, and then took her 
back to his apartment where he raped her after threatening her 
with a gun. 
At trial, petr did not take the stand. Counsel timely 
requested the TC "that an admonition be given to the jury that 
no emphasis be given to the defendant's failure to 
testify ..•. " Petn. 8. The TC denied this request. The jury 
These ver-returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts. 
diets triggered persistent felony proceedings, and the jury 
convicted petr as a first degree persistent felony offender 
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. It 
r' 
a ck n l4ci ow 1 edged th a t under ca r t er v • Kentucky , 4 5 O u . s • 2 8 8 
------(l981), a defendant has the right to an "instruction" to the 
jury on the failure of the defendant to testify. However, it 
purported to distinguish between an "admonition" and an "in-
struction": 
"There is a vast difference in a request for an admo-
nition and a requested instruction. [Petr] was enti-
tled to the instruction but did not ask for it. The 
trial court properly denied the request for an admoni-
tion." Petn. App. 3. 
Thus, it was not error for the TC to · deny the request for an 
admonition. 
The Kentucky Court did not address whether, if there 
had been error, it would have been harmless. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the TC and Kentucky 
Supreme Court have clearly viola tea Carter v. "Kentucky, 450 
- - 3 - -
U.S. 288 (1981). There is no difference between an "admoni-
tion" and an "instruction" for these purposes. The important 
point is that petr was entitl~d to have the jury told that it 
could not draw an adverse inference from his failure to 
testify. 
Nor is there any possibility that the Kentucky Sup. Ct. 
determined that the error was harmless_. 
case, Commonwealth v. McIntosh, Jr., 
In another recent 
S. W. 2d (Feb. 
16, 1983), that court hela that the failure to comply with 
Carter was harmless error. Thus, the Kentucky Court knows how 
to make a finding of harmless error when it wants to. 
DISCUSSION: Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, held 
that it violates the Fifth Amendment to tell a jury that it 
may draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to 
testify. The ratio!lale of the case was that a defendant 
should not be penalized by the court for the exercise of his 
constitutional right not to testify. Griffin was extended in 
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), where this Court held 
(by an 8-1 vote) that "the Fifth Amendment requires that a 
er iminal trial judge must give a 'no-adverse-inference' jury 
instruction when requested by a defendant to do so." Id., at 
300. The Court reasoned: 
"No judge can prevent jurors from speculating about 
why a defendant stands mute in the face of a criminal 
accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to 
do so, use the unique power of the jury instruction to 
reduce that speculation to a minimum." Id., at 303. 
The TJ clearly violated Carter by denying petr' s re-
quest for an "admonition" regarding his failure to testify. I 
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cannot see any aifference between a request for an "admoni-
tion" ana a request for an "instruction" in the circumstances 
of this case. The Kentucky Supreme Court has defined an "ad-
monition" as 
"any authoritative oral communication or statement by 
way of advice or caution by the court to the jury re-
specting their duty or conduct as jurors ..•• " Miller 
v. Noell, 193 Ky. 659, 237 S. W. 2d 373, 374 (1922). 
That is, an "instruction" would tell the jury that it "must 
not" draw an adverse inference, and an "admonition" would tell 
the jury that it "should not" draw an adverse inference. I 
cannot understand how a defendant can have the constitutional 
right to reauire the court to tell the jury that it "must not" 
draw an adverse inference, but not have the constitutional 
right to require the court to tell the jury that it "should 
not" draw an adverse inference. In each case, the judge is 
required to act to reduce the jury's speculation about why the 
defendant has not testified. Thus, the TJ violated Carter by 
denying petr's request that the jury be admonished to give "no 
emphasis" to the defendant's failure to testify. 
It is possible that the Kentucky Supreme Court simply 
misunderstood Carter, and did not intend to flout this Court's 
decision. However, unless "admonition" means something radi-
cally different in Kentucky from what it normally means, the 
fact is that the decision below is plainly contrary to Carter. 
While a good argument can be made that both Griffin and Carter 
were wrongly decided, until this Court overrules them, they 
must be followed by state courts. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
• - - 5 - -
370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) , this Court summarily reversed 
the CA4 for not following Supreme Court precedent, stating 
"[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the feder-
al juaicial system, a precedent of this Court must be 
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to 
be." 
The same principle applies to the State Supreme Courts, which 
are duty-bound to uphold the Cons ti tut ion as interpreted by 
this Court. Accordingly, the Court should summarily vacate 
the decision below, and remand for a determination whether the 
error was harmless. 
I recommend CFR . 
Response waived. 
June 24, 1983 Levene Opn in petn 








From: Justice White 
Circulated: 0 CT 1 1983 
Recirculated: ___ ____ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MICHAEL P. JAMES v. KENTUCKY 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF KENTUCKY 
No. 82-6840. Decided October-, 1983 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Petitioner was tried for burglary, receipt of stolen prop-
erty, and rape. He did not take the stand. At the close of 
the evidence, petitioner's counsel objected to several of the 
instructions being given to the jury. He then noted for the 
record that "[t]he defendant requests that an admonition be 
given to the jury that no emphasis be given to the defendant's 
failure to testify which was overruled." The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on all counts. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. James v. Com-
monwealth, 647 S. W. 2d 794 (Ky. 1983). The Court ac-
knowledged that Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288 (1981), 
requires the trial judge, "upon proper request," to instruct 
the jury not to draw an adverse inference from the defend-
ant's failure to testify. The Court noted, however, that peti-
tioner had requested an admonition rather than an instruc-
tion, and found a "vast difference" between the two. 
Petitioner "was entitled to the instruction, but did not ask 
for it. The trial court properly denied the request for an ad-
monition." James v. Commonwealth, supra, at 795-796 
(emphasis added). 
Kentucky law distinguishes "instructions" from "admoni-
tions." The former are statements of black-letter law de-
signed to guide the jury in its deliberations, the latter cau-
tionary statements regarding the conduct of the jury. See 
Miller v. Noell, 193 Ky. 659, 237 S. W. 373 (1922). Thus, 
the state Supreme Court has used the term "admonishment" 
in referring to statements to the jury requiring it to disre-





2 JAMES v. KENTUCKY 
2d 655, 662 (Ky. 1983); Stallings v. Commonwealth, 556 
S. W. 2d 4 (Ky. 1977), to consider particular evidence for 
purposes of evaluating credibility only, Harris v. Common-
wealth, 556 S. W. 2d 669 (Ky. 1977), and to consider evidence 
as to one co-defendant only, Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 
S. W. 2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1976). A statement to the jury that it 
should not draw an adverse inference from the defendant's 
failure to take the stand would seem to fit neatly into this list. 
Indeed, before Carter, the Kentucky Supreme Court itself 
referred to it as an admonishment. See Scott v. Common-
wealth, 495 S. W. 2d 800, 802 (Ky. 1973); Dixon v. Common-
wealth, 478 S. W. 2d 719 (Ky. 1972); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 457 S. W. 2d 627, 630 (Ky. 1970) (all using the term 
"admonishment" in this context). In light of these cases and 
the principles underlying the distinction, petitioner's trial 
counsel's choice of words was certainly understandable. 
Under the official terminology now recognized in Ken-
tucky, however, the correct term apparently is "instruction." 
That is the word used in Rule 9.54(3) of Kentucky's Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which codifies the result in Carter. 1 
Admonitions are treated separately in Rule 9. 70. That rule 
does not mention a statement to the jury about the defend-
ant's failure to testify. See also Commonwealth v. 
McIntosh, 646 S. W. 2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983) ("instruction"). 
The Kentucky Supreme Court is free to use whatever ter-
minology it wishes. It overstepped the bounds, however, in 
finding that counsel's semantic error justified the trial court 
in refusing to tell the jury not to draw the improper infer-
ence. Kentucky undeniably has some latitude in deciding 
how, consistent with due process, it wishes to run its trials. 
1 In Carter we used the term instruction. Obviously, that usage was 
not intended to have significance under the Kentucky scheme. This 
Court's use of both terms has not been so technical. See Bruno v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (Court unwilling to assume "that jurors, if 
properly admonished, neither could nor would heed the instructions of the 





JAMES v. KENTUCKY 3 
It may require, as it has in criminal rule 9.54(2), that a party 
have presented its position to the trial judge if it wishes to 
challenge on appeal the failure to give an instruction. But it 
cannot circumvent federal constitutional requirements 
through the use of arbitrary rules. The essence of the hold-
ing in Carter v. Kentucky is that if asked to do so the trial 
judge must tell the jury not to draw an adverse inference. 
"A trial judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect 
the constitutional privilege-the jury instruction-and he has 
an affirmative constitutional obligation to use that tool when 
a defendant seeks its employment." Carter v. Kentucky, 
supra, at 303. Petitioner sought the employment of this 
tool. His request came at the appropriate juncture, and the 
trial judge could not but have understood precisely what was 
desired. To rely on the technical defect of using the word 
"admonition" rather than "instruction" is inconsistent with 
the holding and the tenor of Carter. I can perceive no state 
interest in requiring a defendant to use certain magic 
words; 2 particularly as the state Supreme Court itself has in 
the past employed the terminology used by defense counsel 
here. 
Because I think the decision below violates Carter v. Ken-
tucky, I would grant the petition, reverse the decision below, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
2 Neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor the State's response to the 
petition for certiorari indicate any substantive difference between the man-
ner in which requests for "admonitions" and requests for "instructions" are 
treated or the standard by which they are considered. The only practical 
difference between an admonition and an instruction seems to be that the 












I do not recommend joining JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent. 
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.54(3) provides that a de-
fendant who wishes a Carter instruction given to the jury must 
request an "instruction," not an "admonition," as those terms are 
used by Kentucky law. Instructions differ from admonitions as to 
what subject matter they may properly cover, when and in what 
form they are given at trial, and how much discretion the trial 
court enjoys in formulating them. Rule 9.54(3) is a reasonable 
state procedural requirement with which defendant easily could 
have complied and therefore provides an adequate state law ground --for the decision below. 
.. -- •~ . -










From: Justice White 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: OCT 6 1983 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MICHAEL P. JAMES v. KENTUCKY 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY 
No. 82-6840. Decided October-, 1983 
l 
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
Petitioner was tried for burglary, receipt of stolen prop-
erty, and rape. He did not take the stand. At the close of 
the evidence, petitioner's counsel objected to several of the 
instructions being given to the jury. He then noted for the 
record that "[t]he defendant requests that an admonition be 
given to the jury that no emphasis be given to the defendant's 
failure to testify which was overruled." The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on all counts. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. James v. Com-
monwealth, 647 S. W. 2d 794 (Ky. 1983). The Court ac-
knowledged that Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288, 305 
(1981), requires the trial judge, "upon proper request," to in-
struct the jury not to draw an adverse inference from the de-
fendant's failure to testify. The Court noted, however, that 
petitioner had requested an admonition rather than an in-
struction, and found a "vast difference" between the two. 
Petitioner "was entitled to the instruction, but did not ask 
for it. The trial court properly denied the request for an ad-
monition." James v. Commonwealth, supra, at 795-796 
(emphasis added). 
Kentucky law distinguishes "instructions" from "admoni-
tions." The former are statements of black-letter law de-
signed to guide the jury in its deliberations, the latter cau-
tionary statements regarding the conduct of the jury. See 
Miller v. Noell, 193 Ky. 659, 237 S. W. 373 (1922). Thus, 
the state Supreme Court has used the term "admonishment" 
in referring to statements to the jury requiring it to disre-
- -
2 JAMES v. KENTUCKY 
gard certain testimony, Perry v. Commonwealth, 652 S. W. 
2d 655, 662 (Ky. 1983); Stallings v. Commonwealth, 556 
S. W. 2d 4 (Ky. 1977), to consider particular evidence for 
purposes of evaluating credibility only, Harris v. Common-
wealth, 556 S. W. 2d 669 (Ky. 1977), and to consider evidence 
as to one co-defendant only, Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 
S. W. 2d 17 4, 177 (Ky. 1976). A statement to the jury that it 
should not draw an adverse inference from the defendant's 
failure to take the stand would seem to fit neatly into this list. 
Indeed, before Carter, the Kentucky Supreme Court itself 
referred to it as an admonishment. See Scott v. Common-
wealth, 495 S. W. 2d 800, 802 (Ky. 1973); Dixon v. Common-
wealth, 478 S. W. 2d 719 (Ky. 1972); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 457 S. W. 2d 627, 630 (Ky. 1970) (all using the term 
"admonishment" in this context). In light of these cases and 
the principles underlying the distinction, counsel's choice of 
words was certainly understandable. 
Under the official terminology now recognized in Ken-
tucky, however, the correct term apparently is "instruction." 
That is the word used in Rule 9.54(3) of Kentucky's Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which codifies the result in Carter. 1 
Admonitions are treated separately in Rule 9. 70. That rule 
does not mention a statement to the jury about the de-
fendant's failure to testify. See .also Commonwealth v. 
McIntosh, 646 S. W. 2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983) ("instruction"). 
The Kentucky Supreme Court is free to use whatever ter-
minology it wishes. It overstepped the bounds, however, in 
finding that counsel's semantic error justified the trial court 
in refusing to tell the jury not to draw the improper infer-
ence. Kentucky undeniably has some latitude in deciding 
'In Carter we referred to an "instruction". Obviously, that usage was l 
not intended to have significance under the Kentucky scheme. This 
Court's use of both terms has not been so technical. See Bruno v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (Court unwilling to assume "that jurors, if 
properly admonished, neither could nor would heed the instructions of the 
trial court" not to draw an adverse inference). 
- ~ . - -
JAMES v. KENTUCKY 3 
how, consistent with due process, it wishes to run its trials. 
It may require, as it has in criminal rule 9.54(2), that a party . 
have presented its position to the trial judge if it wishes 
to challenge o:n. appeal the failure to give an instruction. But 
it cannot circumvent federal constitutional requirements 
through the use of arbitrary rules. The essence of the hold-
ing in Carter v. Kentucky is that if asked to do so the trial 
judge must tell the jury not to draw an adverse inference. 
"A trial judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect 
the constitutional privilege-the jury instruction-and he has 
an affirmative constitutional obligation to use that tool when 
a defendant seeks its employment." Carter v. Kentucky, 
supra, at 303. Petitioner sought the employment of this 
tool. His request came at the appropriate juncture, and the 
trial judge could not but have understood precisely what was 
desired. To rely on the technical defect of using the word 
"admonition" rather than "instruction" is inconsistent with 
the holding and the tenor of Carter. I can perceive no state 
interest in requiring a defendant to use certain magic 
words; 2 particularly as the state Supreme Court itself has in 
the past employed the terminology used by defense counsel 
here. 
Because I think the decision below violates Carter v. Ken- , 
tucky, I would grant the petition, vacate the decision below, 
and remand for further proceedings·. 
2 Neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor the State's response to the 
petition for certiorari indicate any substantive difference between the man-
ner in which requests for "admonitions" and requests for "instructions" are 
treated or the standard by which they are considered. The only practical / 
differences between admonitions and instructions seem to be that the lat-
ter are put in writing and are only given at the end of the trial. 
•. - e October 7, 1983 Court ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
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82-6840 James v. Kentucky 
MEMO TO FILE: 
~ 
This is another case we should not have taken. 
I voted to deny it. 
In Carter v. Kentucky - here two or three years 
ago - we reversed because of a failure by the trial court 
to instruct the jury that no adverse inference should be 
drawn from the defendant's failure to testify. This 
decision prompted Kentucky to amend its Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to require such an instruction if requested. 
In this case there was no formal reauest for 
such an instruction. 
In this case, after all of the evidence was in 
and apparently after instructions had been requested and 
denied or granted, counsel for defendant "requested th;ji-' 
an admonition be given the jury that no emphasis be given 
to the defendant's failure to testify". 
Respondent's Br., p. 11. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court, 
J.A. p. 95; 
in affirming 
petitioner's conviction, stated that under Kentucky 
l/1/ 
practice a distinction w-a-s made between a mere request for 
an admonition and a request for an instruction. The brief 
y · 
- - 2. 
~ 
by the Attorney General of Kentucky ~makes this same 
representation. If I correctly undertstand this case, 
there was no formal request for instruction. Nor was 
there an exception taken when the court declined to give 
an admonition. 
Based on the record of what both lawyers and the 
court advise ~ he jury in this case, I think there is no 
doubt that defendant had a fair trial. I have rarely seen 
a trial record in which the jury was "admonished" more 
frequently - by the state's attorney, defense counsel and -----the court - as to the heavy burden of proof on the state 
and the presumption of innocence. I may be persuaded 
later that the "admonition" also should have been given. 
My view is that it was harmless error beyond all doubt ---was error indeed. The overriding question is 
defendant was given a fajr trial. 
There is some discussion in the briefs of 
statements made by the prosecuting attorney in his closing 
argument to the effect that defendant introduced no 
evidence to rebut the state's evidence. This was in 
response, however, to repeated statements by defense 
counsel that the state itself had produced no evidence. 
See Respondent's Br., p. 13. 




February 20, 1984 
82-6840 James v. Kentucky 
Dear Al: 
Please take a look at the joint appendix in this 
case. 
~he copy I have has the pageA fouled up. Pages 38 
i.s followed by 103. Pages 39 through 54 seem to be missing. 
I am reminded that at least two sets of briefs for 
the February argument failed to comply with our Rules in 
that the opinions of courts below were not printed in proper. 
type. Since we must read the oµinions of the courts below, 
I would think that someone in the Clerk's Office could al-
ways check the opinions. ~ 
If counsel came to understand - by some sort of 
publicity - that the Rules would be enforced, perhaps this 
disregard of the Rule would occur less frequently. 
I am not unaware of the heavy burden that the 
Clerk's Office carries - and does so very well. I hesitate, 
therefore, to suggest what may be some small additional 
checking. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-6840 
MICHAEL P. JAMES, PETITIONER v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF KENTUCKY 
[April -, 1984] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288 (1981), we held that a 
trial judge must, if requested to do so, instruct the jury not 
to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to 
take the stand. In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
found that the trial judge was relieved of that obligation be-
cause defense counsel requested an "admonition" rather than 
an "instruction." 
I 
Petitioner Michael James was indicted for receipt of stolen 
property, burglary, and rape. 1 James had been convicted of 
two prior felonies-forgery and murder-and the prosecution 
warned that were James to take the stand it would use the 
forgery conviction to impeach his testimony. During voir 
dire, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors how they 
would feel were James not to testify. After a brief exchange 
1 The charges grew out of three separate incidents , all involving Donna 
Richardson. Richardson testified that on April 23, 1980, her house was 
broken into and a gun taken from under her pillows. A week later, she 
came home to find that a pane of glass had been removed from her back 
door, the locks undone, and her pillows messed up. On May 6, James, her 
next-door neighbor, asked to use her telephone to call a doctor. When 
Richardson let him in and began dialing, he put a gun to her side, tied her 
up, brought her to his house , and raped her. 
James had the stolen pistol in his possession when arrested, hence the 
charge of receiving stolen property. His fingerprint was found on the 
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between counsel and one member of the venire, the trial 
judge interrupted, stating: "They have just said they would 
try the case solely upon the law and the evidence. That ex-
cludes any other consideration." App. 29. 2 With that, voir 
dire came to a close. James did not testify at trial. 
- At the close of testimony, counsel and the judge had an off 
the record discussion about instructions. When they re-
turned on the record, James' lawyer noted that he objected to 
several of the instructions being given, and that he "requests 
that an admonition be given to the jury that no emphasis be 
given to the defendant's failure to testify which was over-
ruled." App. 95. 3 The judge then instructed the jury, 
which returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At a subse-
quent persistent felony offender proceeding, the jury sen-
2 We rejected similar logic with regard to the instructions themselves in 
Carter: 
"Kentucky also argues that in the circumstances of this case the jurors 
knew they could not make adverse inferences from the petitioner's election 
to remain silent because they were instructed to determine guilt 'from the 
evidence alone,' and because failure to testify is not evidence. The Com-
monwealth's argument is unpersuasive. Jurors are not lawyers; they do 
not know the technical meaning of 'evidence.' They can be expected to 
notice a defendant's failure to testify, and, without limiting instruction, to 
speculate about incriminating inferences from a defendant's silence." 450 
U. S., at 303-304. 
3 The relevant portion of the transcript reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
"JUDGE MEIGS: Call your witness. You have closed, I am sorry. 
MR. PEALE [defense counsel]: We have closed and has a matter in re-
gards to the instructions. 
OFF THE RECORD. 
MR. PEALE: Note that the defendant objects to several of the instruc-
tions being given to the jury. 
JUDGE MEIGS: Overruled. 
MR. PEALE: The defendant requests that an admonition be given to the 
jury that no emphasis be given to the defendant's failure to testify which 
was overruled. 
JUDGE MEIGS: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, these are your instruc-
tions .... " Tr. (red binding) 3-4. 
A -
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tenced James to life imprisonment in light of his two previous 
convictions. 
On appeal, James argued that the trial judge's refusal to 
tell the jury not to draw an adverse inference from his failure 
to testify violated Carter v. Kentucky, supra. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court conceded that Carter requires the trial 
judge, upon request, to instruct the jury not to draw an ad-
verse inference. James v. Commonwealth, 647 S. W. 2d 
794, 795-796 (1974). The court noted, however, that James 
had requested an admonition rather than an instruction, and 
there is a "vast difference" between the two under state law. 
He "was entitled to the instruction, but did not ask for it. 
The trial court properly denied the request for an admoni-
tion." Ibid. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1983), to determine whether petitioner's asserted procedural 
default adequately supports the result below. We now 
reverse. 
II 
In Carter we held that, in order fully to effectuate the right 
to remain silent, a trial judge must instruct the jury not to 
draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to 
testify if requested to do so. James argues that the essence 
of the holding in Carter is that the judge must afford some 
form of guidance to the jury, and that the admonition he 
sought was the "functional equivalent" of the instruction re-
quired by Carter. The State responds that the trial judge 
was under no obligation to provide an admonition when under 
Kentucky practice James should have sought an instruction. 
An examination of the state-law background is necessary to 
understand these arguments. 
A 
Kentucky distinguishes between "instructions" and "ad-
monitions." The former tend to be statements of black-let-
ter law, the latter cautionary statements regarding the jury's 
conduct. See generally Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 
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S. W. 373 (1922). Thus, "admonitions" include statements 
to the jury requiring it to disregard certain testimony, Perry 
v. Commonwealth, 652 S. W. 2d 655, 662 (Ky. 1983); 
Stallings v. Commonwealth, 556 S. W. 2d 4, 5 (Ky. 1977), to 
consider particular evidence for purposes of evaluating credi-
bility only, Harris v. Commonwealth, 556 S. W. 2d 669, 670 
(Ky. 1977); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 472 S. W. 2d 263, 266 
(Ky. 1971), and to consider evidence as to one co-defendant 
only, Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S. W. 2d 174, 177 (Ky. 
1976). The State Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that 
at each adjournment the jury is to be "admonished" not to 
discuss the case. Ky. Rule Crim Proc. 9. 70 ("Admonition"). 
See generally 1 J. Palmore & R. Lawson, Instructions to 
Juries in Kentucky 16--20, 397-404 (1975) '(hereinafter 
Palmore). 
Instructions, on the other hand, set forth the legal rules 
governing the outcome of a case. They "state what the jury 
must believe from the evidence . . . in order to return a ver-
dict in favor of the party who bears the burden of proof." 
Webster v. Commonwealth, supra, 508 S. W. 2d, at 36. The 
judge reads the instructions to the jury at the end of the trial, 
and provides it a written copy. Ky. Rule Crim Proc. 9.54(1). 
After Carter, Kentucky amended its criminal rules to provide 
that, if the defendant so requests, the instructions must state 
that he is not compelled to testify and that the jury shall not 
draw an adverse inference from his election not to. Id., 
Rule 9.54(3). 4 
The substantive distinction between admonitions and in-
structions is not always clear or closely hewn to. The Ken-
• That rule provides: 
"The instructions shall not make any reference to a defendant's failure to 
testify unless so requested by him, in which event the court shall give an 
instruction to the effect that he is not compelled to testify and that the jury 
shall not draw any inference of guilt from his election not to testify and 
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tucky Supreme Court has recognized that the content of ad-
monitions and instructions can overlap. In a number of 
cases, for example, it has referred to a trial court's failure 
either to instruct or to admonish the jury on a particular 
point, indicating that either was a possibility. E.g., Cald-
well v. Commonwealth, 503 S. W. 2d 485, 493-494 (1972) 
("instructions" did not contain a particular "admonition," but 
the "failure to admonish or instruct" was harmless). See 
also Bennet v. Horton, 592 S. W. 2d 460, 464 (1979) ("instruc-
tions" included the "admonition" that the jury could make a 
certain set-off against the award); Carson v. Commonwealth, 
382 S. W. 2d 85, 95 (1964) ("The fourth instruction was the 
usual reasonable doubt admonition"). The court has ac-
knowledged that "sometimes matters more appropriately the 
subject of admonition are included with or as part of the in-
structions." Webster v. Commonwealth, supra, 508 S. W. 
2d, at 36. 
In pre-Carter cases holding that a defendant had no right 
to have the jury told not to draw an adverse inference, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court did not distinguish admonitions 
from instructions. See, e. g., Luttrell v. Commissioner, 554 
S. W. 2d 75, 79-80 (1977) ("instruction"); Scott v. Common-
wealth, 495 S. W. 2d 800, 802 (1973) ("written admonition," 
"admonition"); Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S. W. 2d 339, 
341 (1972) ("instruction"); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 478 
S. W. 2d 719 (1972) ("an instruction admonishing the jury"); 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S. W. 2d 627, 630 (1970) ("ad-
monition" during another witness' testimony); Roberson v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 49, 118 S. W. 2d 157, 157-158 (1938) 
("admonition"). A statement to the jury not to draw an ad-
verse inference from the defendant's failure to testify would 
seem to fall more neatly into the admonition category than 
the instruction category. Cautioning the jury against con-
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not to consider testimony that was. 5 However, the Ken-
tucky criminal rules treat it as an instruction. See n. 4, 
supra. 
One procedural difference between admonitions and in-
structions is that the former are normally oral, while the lat-
ter, though given orally, are also provided to the jury in writ-
ing. See generally 1 Palmore, ch. 12. However, this 
distinction is not strictly adhered to. As the cases cited 
above indicate, "admonitions" frequently appear in the writ-
ten instructions. See also 1 Palmore 21 ("An 'admonition' 
... need not be given in writing. However, it is not error to 
give such admonition in writing as an instruction"); i d., at 17. 
Conversely, instructions may be given orally only if the de-
fendant waives the writing requirement. Brief for Respond-
ent 25; Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 38-39. The State contends, 
though without citing any authority, that the instructions 
must be all in writing or all oral, and that it would have been 
reversible error for the trial judge to have given this "in-
struction" orally. Yet the Kentucky Supreme Court has 
held, for example, that there was no error where the trial 
court, after reading the written instructions, told the jury 
orally that its verdict must be unanimous, a statement nor-
mally considered an "instruction." Freeman v. Common-
wealth, 425 S. W. 2d 575, 579 (1968). And in several cases 
the Supreme Court has found no error where the trial court 
gave oral explanations of its written instructions. E. g., 
5 Indeed, such a statement is substantively indistinguishable from an 
"admonition" given in this very case. When James was brought into court 
for the persistent felony offender hearing, he was in handcuffs. After re-
questing and being denied a mistrial, his attorney asked: "Can we at least 
have an admonition to the jury, your Honor?" The judge obliged, telling 
the jury it was "admonished not to consider the fact that the defendant was 
brought into the courtroom shackled and handcuffed. That should have 
nothing to do, no bearing at all, on your decision in this case." One won-
ders why the trial judge was unwilling to tell the jury it was "admonished 
not to consider the fact that" James did not take the stand, which also 
"should have [had] nothing to do, no bearing at all" on its decision. 
-
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Allee v. Commonwealth, 454 S. W. 2d 336, 342 (Ky. 1970), 
cert. dismissed, 401 U. S. 950 (1971); Ingram v. Common-
wealth, 427 S. W. 2d 815, 817 (Ky. 1968). Finally, given 
Kentucky's strict contemporaneous objection rule, see, e.g., 
Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S. W. 2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974); 
Reeves v. Commonwealth, 462 S. W. 2d 926, 930 (Ky. 1971); 
Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.54(2), it would be odd if it were re-
versible error for the trial court to have given a Carter in-
struction orally at the defendant's request. See also 
Weichland v. Garlinger, 447 S. W. 2d 606, 610 (Ky. 1969) 
(harmless error to give oral admonition where written in-
struction was requested and appropriate). 
B 
There can be no dispute that, for federal constitutional pur-
poses, James adequately invoked his substantive right to 
I 
jury guidance. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 422 
(1965). The question is whether counsel's passing reference 
to an "admonition" is a fatal procedural default under Ken-
tucky law adequate to support the result below and to pre-
vent us from considering petitioner's constitutional claim. 
In light of the state-law background described above, we hold 
that it is not. Kentucky's distinction between admonitions 
and instructions is not the sort of firmly established and regu-
larly followed state practice that can prevent implementation 
of federal constitutional rights. Cf. Barr v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U. S. 146, 149 (1964). Carter holds that if asked to 
do so the trial court must tell the jury not to draw the imper-
missible inference. To insist on a particular label for this 
statement would "force resort to an arid ritual of meaningless 
form," Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 320 (1958), and 
would further no perceivable state interest, Henry v. Missis-
sippi, 379 U. S. 443, 471 (1965). See also NAACP v. Ala-
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term that both we 6 and the State Supreme Court have used 
in this context and which is reasonable unde;r state law and 
normal usage. As Justice Holmes wrote 60 years ago: 
"Whatever springes the State may set for those who are en-
deavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the asser-
tion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is 
not to be defeated under the name of local practice." Davis 
v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24 (1923). 
C 
The State argues that this is more than a case of failure to 
use the required magic word, however. It considers James' 
request for an admonition to have been a deliberate strategy. 
He sought an oral statement only in order to put "less empha-
sis on this particular subject, not before the jury, not in writ-
ing to be read over and over, but to have been commented 
upon and passed by." Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. James, now 
represented by his third attorney, seems to concede that the 
first attorney did seek an oral admonition. He does not 
argue that the trial court had to include the requested state-
ment in the instructions, 7 though he suggests that it could 
have done so, and that he would have been happy with either 
a written or an oral statement. Brief for Petitioner 23-25. 
We would readily agree that the State is free to require 
that all instructions be in writing; 8 and to categorize a no-ad-
verse-inference statement as an instruction. The Constitu-
6 See Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287, 294 (1939) (Court unwilling 
to assume "that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor would 
heed the instruction of the trial court" not to drawn an improper inference). 
7 When asked at oral argument whether his "basic argument [is] that 
your client was entitled to an instruction because he had requested some-
thing almost like an instruction or that he was entitled to an admonition 
because he had requested an admonition," petitioner's counsel answered 
that his "basic argument is that he was entitled to an admonition, at the 
very least." Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. 
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tion obliges the trial judge to tell the jury, in an effective 
manner, not to dr!=l,W the inference if the defendant so re-
quests; but it does not afford the defendant the right to dic-
tate, inconsistent with state practice, how the jury is to be 
told. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 485-486 (1978). 
In Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333 (1978), we held that the 
judge may give a no-adverse-inference instruction over the 
defendant's objection. Given that, the State may surely give 
a written instruction over the defendant's request that it be 
oral only. And if that is so, the State can require that if the 
instruction is to be given, it be done in writing. For reasons 
similar to those set out in Lakeside, we do not think that a 
State would impermissibly infringe the defendant's right not 
to testify by requiring that if the jury is to be alerted to it, it 
be alerted in writing. See generally Cupp v. Naughten, 414 
u. s. 141, 146 (1973). 
This is not a case, however, of a defendant attempting to 
circumvent such a firm state procedural rule. For one thing, 
as the discussion in Part II-A, supra, indicates, the 
oral/written distinction is not as solid as the State would have 
us believe. Admonitions can be written and instructions 
oral, and the Kentucky Supreme Court has itself used the 
term "admonition" in referring to instructions that "admon-
ish." In addition, our own examination of the admittedly in-
complete record 9 reveals little to support the State's view of 
petitioner's request. The single passing reference to an "ad-
monition" is far too slender a reed on which to rest the con-
clusion that petitioner insisted on an oral statement and noth-
ing but. 
Apart from this one use of the term, there is absolutely 
nothing in the record to indicate any such insistence. In-
deed, other indications are to the contrary. Before going off 
the record, defense counsel stated that he had "a matter in 
• Neither of the trial lawyers was involved in the appeal. Thus, appel-
late counsel and the appellate court were working from the same 
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regards to the instructions." Tr. (red binder) 3 (emphasis 
added). Returning to the record, he noted that he "ob-
ject[ ed] to several of the instructions being given to the jury" 
and that his request for "an admonition" to the jury regard-
ing the defendant's failure to testify had been overruled. 
The court below inferred from these two statements that 
counsel had sought an oral statement apart from the instruc-
tions. Yet the statements could also be a shift from an ob-
jection to what was being said to the jury ("the instructions 
being given"), to an objection to what was not ("requests an 
admonition ... which was overruled"). It is also possible 
that counsel sought both a written and an oral statement and 
was denied on both counts. 
Where it is inescapable that the defendant sought to invoke 
the substance of his federal right, the. asserted state-law de-
fect in form must be more evident than it is here. In the cir-
cumstances of this case, we cannot find that petitioner's con-
stitutional rights were respected or that the result below 
rests on independent and adequate state grounds. 
III 
Respondent argues that even if there was error, it was 
harmless. It made the same argument below, but the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court did not reach it in light of its conclusion 
that no error had been committed. We have not determined 
whether Carter error can be harmless, see Carter, 450 U. S. , 
at 304, and we do not do so now. Even if an evaluation of 
harmlessness is called for, it is best made in state court be-
fore it is made here. The case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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